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SYED F4WAB H4IDER NiQVI 
It is proposed in this paper to investigate , at a 
theoretical level , the nature of ;:he relationship between 
commercial policy and the allocation of domestic resources j 
and evaluate he relative effectiveness of "he' former in 
influencing she l atter , as compared with the other joolic^; 
ins • rlaments available to the government. 
T a r i f f s , quotas and other import resoric ions have 
been suggested in some writings' on development policy and 
have actually been used by governments as "he primary policy 
instruments to in it iate ~nd accelerate economic development. 
One of "he mos*4- common economic argument for protection, at 
the theoretical l e ve l , h-s bren th^t , i f the allocation of 
investment resources among alternative opportunities is not 
pareto-optimal b°c^use of a divergence between private and 
social costs nnd benef its , free trade w i l l lowetf'"h* country's 
welfare by comparison with an ideal resource-allocation policy . 
Such a divergence may be caused by external economics (or 
diseconomies) in consumption or production or by the presence 
of monopoly elements in domestic production or it may be due 
to a wage-differential between agriculture and industry, or 
"disguised" unemployment in the rural sector (The argument, will 
* The author is a Research Economist at the- Pakistan Institute 
of Development. Economics, This paper is a revised version of 
Chapter 1 of my P h . D . thesi's' -(Commercial Policy and Resource 
Allegation (in Pakistan ) . Princeton University , 1 9 6 6 ) . I am 
mainly indebted to Professors Fritz. Machlup and H . G . Georgiadis, 
my dissertation advisors , who .helped me in writing, the original 
version of this paper. I must, also acknowledge my indebtedness t 
Professor Harry Johpson who read through the original version 
of this paper and commented extensively on i t . Professors Jan 
Tinb**gen and Lloyd G. Reynolds also took the trouble of read-
ing through the paper and commenting on i t . However, none of the 
economists, referred to above, is responsible for this revised 
version, which is substantially the same as the original version 
Fo? a In the last reckoning, and in keeping with the brave and 
time*hallowe-tradition, the author alone is responsible for any 
erroy that may s t i l . 
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the 
referred to hereinafter os / welfare-economic ease for 
protection) . The oth^r basic economic argument for 
protection is :h-t, because, of a wie'e d i f ferential 
between the private rate of -1iscount an'"1 the social 
rate of discount, free-trade policy may lead to a sub-
optimal allocation of domestic resources, (This 'wi l l be 
referred to hereinafter as the "growth" case for pro-
1/ 
tection) . 
. ... The main contention of. this paper is that when 
"distortions" 9 due to whatever reason, . occur in domestic 
production, protection will f a i l to remove them^ instead 
a policy of taxes and subsidies on selected lines of 2 / 
production will do the .30b, The main source of error in 
the protectionist arguments is that, when considering : 
the problem of choosing the best policy instrument to 
achieve the desired investment pattern, the•range.of 
policy alternatives.has been limited to policies influenc-
ing foreign trade only-thet i s , to a positive t a r i f f , or 
a negative tar i f f (subsidy) or a zero tar i f f (free, 
trade) . This limitation on ^he range of alternatives, hps 
obscured the point in a given situation , the best 
policy instrument may fa l l outside this range. The range 
of alternatives has to be expanded, to include the whole 
spectrum of policy inscruments available to policy-makers. 
1 / For a convenient summary of both Wis "welfare" and the 
-"growth"--ar guments for protection' See, My i n t 3 1 7 . 
However,- my main sources of inspiration are Meade £ 2 8 _ _ / , 
Bhagwati and Rama Swami / S ? -and. Harry Johnson Z 
Johnson's, recent contribution Z b e c a m e available 
" . to me after I had written the, original version. -However, 
it helped me considerably in clarifying some important 
points . 
2 / This .statement is subject to one important qualif ication : 
it is possible to get the effect of a tax on industry A, 
by subsidizing industries B . . . . . . . . 
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In general , when considering the problems of the optimization 
of trade and the maximization of domestic production, it must 
be borne in min^. th^-t, although in a. general-equilibrium frame-
work each policy instrument has some influence on every 
possible " t a r g e t " , yet to each "target" ^hp? 0 corresponds a 
'specific policy instrument (or a combination of policy in-
3/ 
struments) that is optimal. Such an approach to economic 
policy-making may not. be applicable in very underdeveloped 
countries, where f iscal and other policy instruments are too 
"weak" . In that event protection may be the only feasible and 
effective policy alternative open to the government. However, 
in countries l ike Pakistan and I n d i a , where several policy 
instruments are available , the government must decide not 
only on the optimal use that can be m-~de of a given policy 
instrument in different situations . It must also decide on 
the optimality of that policy instrument in a given situ-
ation* This latter decision forms the crux of economic 
policy-making. 
The discussion in this paper w i l l be divided into 
three sections. The f irst sec'-ion w i l l outline ^nd evaluate 
the welfare-economic case for protection. The "growth" case 
wi l l be .examined in the second section-, while the third 
section w i l l conclude this discussion. 
For the purposes of this discussion, protection is 
defined to cover all policies that raise domestic prices 
3 / See Jan TinbergSn 38__/ . An extensive application 
of this approach to international-trade policy is 
' contained in James -E. - Meade i 27,J7| see also Chenery 
: I 10 / . 
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Departures from the Par-eto Optimum 
However3 it has been noted in the l iterature on 
welfare economics thrt external economies (and diseconomies) 
• • .... 
in domestic production, monopoly in the product market or 
in foreign' traa'e, ~factor-price "r igidities / " increasing returns 
to scale and inter-sectoral wage-price dif ferential will 
prevent free trade from achieving the social optimum. Hence, 
state intervention will be required to maximize social 
welfare . 
To see this clearly^ let us note two basic things 
about the nature of the ideal free-trade solution under the 
firsts-best assumption referred to above. F i r s t , the classical 
theorem \that fres trade maximizes the world welfare should hot 
be taken to mean that it w i l l maximize each country's wel-
fare also. In terms of the Sdgeworth box diagram, what free 
trade does is to enable both parties to trade to l.-nd on a. 
contract curve, which is a locus of an in f in ite number of 
points where world welfare is maximized, such that a movement 
away from it involves a deterioration in each party 's 
welfare . How ever V free tirade does not help in picking out 
the optimum point . In other words, wh~t the classical 
theorem proves is that with free trade each country w i l l 
be better off in equilibrium than ' in the absence of, .trade. 
It does not prove that each country's gain wil l be a 
maximum under free trade . Secondly, and this follows from 
the f i r s t , considering from,one country's point of view, 
it is always profitable to movp along the contract curve 
to the opposite end of the box* However, this necessarily 
involves an improvement in one country's welfare at the 
expense of the other country* In other words, it is not 
trade <••• '•• 
true that free/^ximiz_cS_ tjhe.. welfare, of each, country 
engaged in international trade in the sense thatiit fore-
... .. .. * 5 T ' "' ' "T V" ""' *" ' 
, . \ ' ' ' <•"•>• 
closes the possibi l ity of any movement along the contract 
' t . . : , ' V ; 
cuffve. As a j a i l e r .^f• f a c t , the- maximum gain for one country 
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• wi l l be achieved when the other "-country's gain is zero 
v (However, the other country's gain canriot become negative 
'since it is not possible to go out ' Ide the " b o x " . In plain 
language, i f the other party 's gain were to 'be negative, it 
- 1 0 / 
would not enter into international trade at a l l j , 
The theory-of optimum .tariffs specified .theaprecise 
conditions that set limits on the ex enc to which one country 
. •. • f > i ' 
can profitably move along the contract curve to the other 
end of the box - that i s , the extent to which, one country can 
gain at the expense of the other country by imposing a t a r i f f 
on trade . It is a well-known proposition .in-trade thpory that 
so long as the .foreigner's offer curve is not a- straight l ine 
from the origin- that, is,-so- long as the foreigner's, reciprocal 
demand for .a .country's exports is not ^infinitely elastic - it 
is possible for one country to increase its welfare by 
"twisting" i-ts offer curve, that .is by -imposing a t a r i f f 
on its exports and imports,. The t a r i f f w i l l be optimum when 
the "twisted" offer curve intersects with the other country's 9• offer curve at a poi.:.. -.;her.e- jfche indifference curve of the 
country imposing the tar i f f is tangent to the. other country's 
• < 1 1 / ^ " : -
offer curve . It follows that, free trade is not.the best 
" .. A. i j •: X .1: 
policy when a country.has monopoly-or monopsony power in 
foreign trade . 
Similarly., external economies (and diseconomies) in 
domestic production make it impossible for private economic 
units to..appropriate, through ordinary pricing , the full 
benefits emanating from their a c t i v i t i e s . Private profit-
ability w i l l then differ from social prof i tab i l i ty . Free 
market forces wi l l f a i l to achieve the social optimum 
in domestic production. This cleavage between private and 
social'-profitability 'strikes' at the very roots'o.f the 
. .10/ The-discussion is . based c n Samuelson / 3 5 / „ , See also 
Graff /_ 1 2 _ / . - . . - ~ 
11 / S^e-T. de Scitovszky /_ 36a-/» It should, however, be no'red 
"that exporters must have a.,, collective monhpely power but 
compete on foreign market? . ' ' I f they carte^l'ze the domesti 
market, only that makes the situation worfe. 
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transformation and substitution and the foreign marginal rate of 
14 / 
transformation will be disrupted. This inequality , 
i : . • f- ,-. 
referred to hereinafter as "foreign-trade d istort ion " , 
implies that a free-trade policy will'-'cause the community's 
total welfare to decrease by making the country pay more, in 
terms of exports, for given amounts of imports than it would 
have, had it exploited its monopoly position . 
The Welf-^re-Sconomic Case for Projection: An Evaluation 
As shown above , both domestic and foreign-trade 
"distortions" render free trade an inappropriate policy 
for maximizing social welfare . According to •'"he conventional 
welfare-economic argument, protection is "the "optimal" 
-.ail . j 1 6 / 
policy in both these cases. It w i l l be shown that this 
argument is fa l lacious . The'mere fact that in a certain 
situation free trade cannot guarantee the optimum solution 
does not entitle us ''o conclude that protection can. All 
14 / It should be noted that this result w i l l hold only I.J 
i f exporters do not exploit the potential monopoly 
in foreign trade . 
1 5 / The reason why free-trade, policy-may lead to a sub-
optimal solution is easily explained. I t was shown 
above that free-trade policy w i l l le--.d to an optimal 
solution ( i . e . , the three basic equalities referred to above 
be sat is f ied ) only when domestic exporters take the 
foreign price ratio as f i xed . When foreign prices vary 
increased exports wil l normally lead to a fa l l in export-
prices 5 also increased imports w i l l tend to raise the . 
foreign prices of imports. Hence, fr>e-trade ( policy' w i l l 
lower social marginal revenue from exports' -^ hd increase 
social marginal costs of imports. I t follows th":t a 
tax on exports and on imports set at the right rate , 
! will increase" social revenue and low~r social costs. 
Thus a tax on foreign trade is the optimal policy in 
order to restore the optimum-securing string of equalities 
among the domestic marginal social rate of substitution, 
the domestic and foreing social marginal rates of trans-
formation, when foreign prices "are. no longer "fixed 
because exporters (importers) enjoy a Monopoly (monopsony) 
power in the foreign market. This is the rationale of the 
optimum-tar i f f argument for protection, referred to above. 
1 6 / For instance , see Haberler / 1 3 J , 
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that we can validly conclude is chat government intervention 
is called for in such cases. Howevers the decision on the 
particular form that this intervention should "take will 
• . • <1 
depend on a consideration of the relative effectiveness of 
all the policy instruments available to government. It wil l 
be shown that whereas protection is the optimal policy when 
distortion occurs in-foreign trade, subsidy (or tax) on 
domestic production is recommended instead in the case of 
domestic distortion . Each of !_hese cases is separately 
examined below. • '•' 
The Op-.imality Criterion 
: - f •' ' 
The criterion for testing the optimality of any policy 
instrument is its ability" to remove the distortion in 
question without introducting any other distortion . This 
is fundamental- for i f a policy removes one distortion at 
the expense of introducing another, then rhere "is no a 
priori way to test its. optlmality. This follows from the 
Negative' Corollary o f the General Theorem.of the Second 
Best, which informs us that " there " is no a priori way to 
judge among various situations in which some: of "he 
Paretian conditions are f u l f i l l e d whole others are not 
- i v ' . ; / 1 
!! 
.We w i l l now separately consider, the case for 
."''pr.otf.cti.oh;- for each type o f distortion in the light 
of this criterion. ; ;--.••' 
1 7 / See , Lipsey and Lancaster, • 
- 1 1 ~ 
The Case for Protection; "Domestic. Pist.o.r.t.ions." 
Let us assume' that 3 because of any of the causes 
noted above, say external economies in production, the 
domestic social, marginal rate of substitution (which 
under perfect co„mpet. '.' n is equal to tae domestic 
commodity price ratio) is unequal to the domestic social 
marginal rate of transformation. Let us also assume that 
t xe domestic social iiiargi'nal rate of substitution is equal 
to tie foreign social marginal rate of transformation. The 
foreign price ratio is also asstT'jd to be f ixed for the 
domestic exporters and importers. 
A free-trade ^olicy will f a i l to remove this "dis-
tortion" :in domestic production. This is easily seen. Free 
trade, assuming zero transport costs, tends to equalize 
the domestic price ratio with the f o r ;.gn price ratio , . 
By assumption, the domestic commodity arice ratio is 
unequal to domestic marginal social rate of transformation. 
Al^Ojby assumption, the f orsigk-'p^ice ratio is equal to 
18/ 
the foreign marginal rate of tfansformation. It follows 
that after the opening up of tirade the domestic social 
marginal rate of transformation will become unequal to 
the foreign social 'marginal rate" of transformation. 
Moreover, as before, the domestic' social marginal rate 
of substitution wi. 11 continue to be equal to the 
foreign social marginal rate of transformation and 
to deviate fro;i the domestic social marginal rate of 
.r ' 
t 
i 
3,8/ l-'hen tie foreign pitlce ratio is -assumed f i x e d for 
domestic e iporters 'and importers (either be cause it is 
in fact f i x e d or t-e country in question i.'* too small 
i n relation to the foreign country) it w i l l be equal 
to the foreign marginal rate of transformati on. 
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transformation. Thus free-trade policy will f a i l to 
restore the optimum-securing equality. Hence, free trade 
is a non-optimal polic / when the distortion domestic, 
according to the agreed optimality criterion. 
If an import tar i f f is imposed to remove t'ne domes-
- tic "d istortion " , Land is set at exact ly„.the>r right_ rate^ 
domestic production will increase t^ the-point there the 
domestic social marginal rate of transformation becomes 
equal to t'ne foreign .social marginal rate of transformation 
(which is equal to the foreign price ration) . However, 
since by assumption the domestic marginal rate of substi-
tution was equal to the foreign marginal rate of trans-
formation before nrotection, the imposition, of the import 
tariff w i l l now make them unequal. Again, as protection 
removes one "distortion" at the expense of introducing 
another, protection is also a non-optimal policy,according 
to the agreed optimality criterion. Furthermore, ?? both 
free trade and protection are non-optimal pol ic ies , there 
i ? n© a perj-ori way of prefering one to the other. 
However, a subsid 7 (tax) on domestic production 
for domestic consumption only, jset^at^axact thg_ right 
rate will increase (decrease) it to. t e point vhere the 
domestic eScial marginal rate of transformation becomes 
equal to the domestic social marginal rate of substitution. 
Also since the subsidy (or tax ) , unlike import t a r i f f s , 
39.2 Thip is because, unlike the free-trade case"considered 
above, . tariff,« will nake the foreign price ratio un-
equal to (higher than) t e domestic price ratio* Since 
th$ domestic marginal social rate of substitution is 
assumed equal to the domestic pric:e ratio , it will 
become unequal to the foreign marginal rate transfor-
mation (which Is assumed, equal to foreign price ratio) 
after a protective tar i f f is imposed. 
. _ . 1 3 - -
does nothing to distu: the pre-existing equality 
between domestic social marginal rate of substitution 
and tie foreign marginal rate of transformation, the 
pareto-optimal string of equality- is restored., si gni-
fying the maximizationof total domestic welfare. It 
follows that the policy of subsidizing (taxing) domestic 
production, when domestic distortion ex ists , is the 
optimal policy , (However, note that t -is result depends 
on the assumption regarding the "neutrality" of the 
taxes imposed to finance the subsidy in question.The signi-
f i c a n c e of this assumption i s discussed in the concluding 
section) • 
This result is intuit ively obvious; .whereas protec-
tion encourages domestic production, it also restricts 
domestic consumption b? raising the domestic prices of 
imported goods. In other words, protection imposes a 
"consumption cost" on the economy. On tie other hand, a 
subsidy on domestic production encourages domestic produc-
tion , but imposes no such "consumption cost" , ence, the 20/ 
latter policy is to be preferred to the former policy,, 
( 2 ) The Gase_f0r_frotection ; _The "F.orgj.gnr? rac e 
Distortion^ 
Fow, suppose that there, is no "domestic distortion" 
that i s , the domestic social marginal rate of substitution 
is..equal to the domestic social marginal rate of transfor-
mation. Also, suppose t iat, unlike the case considered 
above, the foreign irices of exports and imports, or of bot h , 
are no longer fixed for the country in question but v^ry. 
This may be because the country enjoys a monopoly power 
in the export market and a monopsony power in respect of 
i ts imports } or bot . In sue'- circumstances, as pointed out 
»~ • • - - r-
20 / Thi-s is so -because a tar i f f is simultaneously a nro-
duation subsidy and a consumption tax. ^ee Johnson 
on th^.s point. 
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above, the marginal social revenue from additional exports 
wi l l normally be leaa t an the price and the margiaal 
social cost of additional imports will normally exceed 
the price, ~en.ce domestic social marginal rates of 
substitution and transformation (assumed equal to each 
ot;ier) w i l l d i f fer from t e foreign social marginal 
rate of transformation. 
If a free-trade policy is pursued - that i s , i f 
exporters and importers are not allowed to exploit their 
monopoly and monopsony power respectively-cou cry's total 
welfare will not be maximized even though wo rid.' L
J "3 if arc 
is maximize^. Thus under free trade the domestic social 
marginal rates of transformation and substitution (equal 
to each other) wil l continue to d i f fer from the foreign 
social marginal rate of transformation. The free-trade 
solution w i l l , therefore, be non-optimal. 
Unlike the previous case where "distortion1 1 was 
domestic, i f distortion occurs in foreign trade a subsidy 
on domestic production ( for domestic consumption only) wil l 
equalize the domestic social 'marginal"* rate of substitutio ' 
and the foreign social marginal rate of transformation but 
will disrupt the .pre-existing equality between domestic 
social marginal rate of substitution, and the domestic 
21/ 
social marginal rate of transformation. Hence, according to 
the optimality criterion noted above, both tiese policies 
are non-optimal, a? they remove one-"distortion" at the 
expense of introducing another. Also, there is no a priori 
way of choosing between themj. for it is like choosing 
"between the devil ancj the deep blue s e a . " 
1^7"" The reaso n* f or this 'inequality'islhit"*a"*su'b"sidy on 
domestic-production will raise domestic prices to 
domestic producers only.. This .. higher price , while-
equal to the domestic aarginal social rate of transfor-
mation, " i l l not be eeual to thf domestic marginal rate 
o.T substitution, Ihe two rates Mi l l , therefore, not he 
o»qual to the common p?ice ratio , and. hence unequal to 
teach other. 
r 
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A tar i f f on exports and on imports or on both, 
set_ at_ the^ right rate in order to expliot the potential 
monopoly and monopsony aower, or both, that the country 
may enjoy over t ' e other country will do the trick here. 
While it wil l do nothing to disturb t 'e pre-existing 
equality between the domestic social marginal rates of 
substitution and transformation, it will restore the 
equalit between domestic social larginal rate of transfor-
mation and the foreign social marginal rate of transfor-
mation. (Recall that the latter rate is no longer equal 
to the foreign price ratio since the international 
prices are assumed to var ) . Thns an optimum tar i f f on 
exports or imports, depending on whether the country enjoys 
monopoly power in the export market or monopsony power with 
respect to its imports, will maximize country's welfare.The 
optimum-securing string of equalities will be restored, and. 
the community 1 s welfare will be maximized. 
T'-'e policy implication of the above discussion can 
now be summarized in the form of the following propositions 
Proposition 1; k subside (or tax) on domestic 
production is the optimal policy when the "distortion" is 
domestic; when, on the ot \er hand, the "distortion" occurs 
22/ 
in foreign trade, protection is the optimal policy. (This 
2 3 / 
proposition is extended below). 
,22/ It may be objected that it is perhaps illegitimate to 
use the term "foreign-trade distortion" for the "non-
exploit at io^of a potential monopoly posit ion " . For by 
the same argument an industry consisting of 100 firms, 
not combined in a cartel, could be considered as suf-
fering from a "distortion" in sel l ing , =ince its terms 
of trade could be improved if it were to combine and 
conspire i n restraint of trade. lowever, eve.o in this 
case, the use of the term is quite legitimate i f we 
identify the welfare concept with the owners of 100 
f i rms. 
23 / For a similar conclusion See m'eade/~28/, Bhagwati and 
Krishna Swami f b j , ' 7 , Johnson has 
stated this result more generally ^ " "18^ / . 
This should be intuitively obvious. Ill this 1 
proposition says is "that t ie choice Of the optimal policy 
must be dictated by the tyoe of t e situation faced. It 
should also be noted that this proposition does not assert, 
for instance, t'^at tariffs cannot be used to encourage 
domestic production. All it says is that a subside on 
domestic production can achieve this objective 'more 
directly and e f f ic iently . 
e^ f JPjgff jlgg-.'_J/j-JjP.rjlSr.. j-.11.. Factor ,Us e^ 
We now turn to an examination of arguments for 
protection that were considered by their authors as "dynamic 
i n contrast to- the " stat ic " - welfare arguments for protec-
tion considered above. It w i l l be shown that these apparen-
tly dynamic arguments are essentially " stat ic " and. merely 
constitute special cases of the more general argument for 
protection evaluated in the last section. According to the 
static-welfare argument considered above, protection is 
the optimal policy to remove "distortion" caused by a 
divergence-between private and social costs and benefits. 
The arguments for protection considered in this section 
d i f f e r from those examined in th- previous section only 
in that these are based" on the presence of a special type 
of dome - tic-distortion - the distortion in factor use. 
The main difference between these two sets of 
arguments lies in t e importance thateach attaches to the 
divergence between private and social costs and benefits. 
Whereas the static-welfare argument of the previous section 
regards these divergences as temporary deviations from the 
Contd 
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optimal situation and, hence, ma rice t prices reflect , 
2 4 / 
as a rale , opportunity costs} the arguments reviewed 
i n this section regard t^ese deviations to be the rule, 
the optimal situation b e i n g a n unattainable S I Dorado. 
25 / 
Hence, market prices do not reflect opportunity costs. 
It i s , however, obvious t at whether t is phenomenon is 
temporary or permanent is a factual judgment and. does not 
affect the conclusions that fellow from the presence of 
this phenomenon. 
There are two' closely related but distinct argu^ 
ments, put forward by Lewis /"~21_/, and Hagen /"~14J7, that 
recommended protection as the Optimal policy in order to 
correct the domestic distortion caused by t \e alleged 
divergence between the marginal social rate of transforming 
agriculture into manufacturing and. the market orice ratio. 
' According to Art -ur Lewis /~21_7, in u der developed 
'countries in w'~ich the sup ly of labor is unlimited in 
the rural sector the "shadow" wage of labour is zero 
because of the alleged zero marginal productivity of 
labour but t'^e market wage is positive . In other 
words, labour is actually paid a wage equal to its 
average product, which is greater than its marginal X i v '-'• • 1 
product. Lewis argues that i f t e comparative-cost 
ratios are expressed in marginal terms, instead of i n 
26/ 
terms of' average costs, an underdeveloped agricultural 
2 4 / " . . . . . . . . . roughly and as a rule, the ratios of private 
money costs, do reflect the true social real cost ratio 
there are exceptions to the rule, b u t . . . the 
burden of proof is on those who maintain that the 
exoeptions are persistent , large, and last but not 
least , practically reqognizeable and calculable" . 
Haberler- /~13 7 , P0 .237-38. 
2 S e e Chenery, / " Q j f pp.. 18-53. 
26/Comparative-cbst ratios in traditional theory are 
expressed, in terms pf average cost because, under the 
assumption of constant costs, marginal costs equal 
average costs . 'However, it has long been recognized, 
that, when increasing or diminishing costs prevail , 
the comparative-cost ratios must be expressed in 
terms of marginal cost-;, 
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country ought-to specialize in manufacturing rather 
than in agriculture. But since in actual practice wages 
are paid according to average productivity, an under-
developed countr ought to protect it? manufacturing 
' 2 7 / 
industry. But this argument is fallacious because it may 
be. that even after the necessary correction.recommended 
by Lewis the countrv may s t i l l have a comparative 
advantage in agriculture. This cannot therefore be a 
general conclusion. 
Moreover, strictly speaking, the sort of 
"distortion" referred to in the previous paragraph 
does not necessarily justify protection* A. more direct 
approach in such a situation will be to reduce the rural 
money wage or subsidize the urban money wage. Here free 
trade continues to he the best policy . It is true that 
practical expediency rules out the optimal solution, but 
it is important to recognize that the policy of protection 
is dictated by practical exigencies rather than by the 
" f a i l u r e " of the optimal solution. 
27 / "V/e assume t ; ,atfeo- countries can produce the same 
things nnd trade wit each other. A is the country where 
labor is scarce, B the country where unlimited supply 
of labor is available in the subsistence (food)sector . 
Using the classical framework for comparative costs, 
we write that one day 's labor. 
in produces 3 food or 3 cotton manufactures; 
i n B , produces 2 food or 1 cotton manufactures. 
This , of course, gives the wrong answer to the question, 
"who should specialize in which" " sin oe we have "written 
the average instead of marginal product.'. We can assume 
that these coincide in A and also in cotton manufacture 
in B. Then we should write in marginal terms that one 
day 's labour, 
in A, produces 3 food or 3 cotton manufactures; 
in B, produces 0 food or 1 cotton manufactures. 
B should specialize in cotton aanufacture and import 
food, In practice , however, wages will be 2 food in B 
and. between 3 food and 6 food in- 1, at ^hlch level it 
w i l l be "cheaper" for B to export food and import 
cotton. Lewis argue that to correct this divergence 
between private money cost and true social cost . (the 
"shadow" wage) , B should ••rotect its text i le industry. 
Lewis /-21_y , p. 185. 
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Furthermore3 because af tbis distortion in a ricul-
ture,land gets less than its marginal produ-tivity, >hile 
labour gets more than its marginal productivity, lence, 
it might be desirable to subsidize land ( i f we can take 
" land" to include capital in agriculture) . 
There, is yet another point about the Le^is argument 
that should be noted.The alleged distortion implies that 
the social return on capital invented in agriculture 
exceeds the private returns; Hence, as Johnson 18J7 
points out, t x- distortion in the labour market may e 
offset by an opposite distortion in the capital market. 
The optimal polic-- will , then, be a subsidy on capital 
invested, in agriculture rather than a subsidy on labour 
in industry. 
Recently, Ha gen has advanced the thesis that the 
observed, wage - di f ferential between agriculture and 
industry causes a domestic "distortion" - that i s , 
the private profitabil ity of transforming agriculture 
into manufacturing is lower than its social prof itabi l ity . 
He attributes this d i f ferent ial (urban wage higher than 
the agricultural wage) to the- "dynamic!' need of the 
economy of transferring labour frcm agriculture to 
indust r ; . T h i s divergence, he argues ,; needs ? to corrected. 
28/ 
throug the protection of manufacturing. 
. Hager 's analysis is faulty . F i rst , contrary to 
what Hagen claims, his analysis is essentially a special 
case of the welfare - static argument reviewed in the last 
sections the wage d i f ferential prevents.market forces 
fro a attaining the Pareto-Optimum in production. 
" -Is a result of wage" disparity",~the~manufacturing-" 
industry will be undersold by imports when the 
foreign exchanges are in equilibrium. Protection 
---• • which permits such industry to exist w i l l increase 
real income in the--economy.... . ^ "Everett Hagen 
£~ 14_7 . -i s imila? point of view-has been presented 
by R .E . Baldwin , ^ 1 ^ 7 . 
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Second, Hagen's argument that protection is the optimal 
policy to realize the pa re to-optimum in production is 
incorrect. By a. reasoning similar to that underlying 
proposition 1, it can be shown that the alleged 
divergence in the rates of transforming agriculture 
into an industry and the market price ratio can be 
more directly and effectively rectified by subsidizing , 
rather t"an protecting(-s Hagen argues) manufacturing 
act ivity . 
Furthermore, it should be noted that, in the 
case analysed by Hagen, the "distortion" is caused by 
an inter-sectoral wage- d i f ferent ial . In other words, 
the rate at which labour and any other factor can be 
substituted, for each other in different lines of 
production, at the margin is not the same. Hence, a jp.Jpsi^ 
should be given on factor-use in manufacturing rather 
than on total production. 
This result suggests a modification of our 
•i 
proposition 1 as follows;-
Proposition 2; i tax (or subsidy) on factor-
use is the optimal polic when "domestic distortion" 
29 / 
is caused by inter-sectoral wage-differential. 
The rationale .of t lis proposition should be 
f. • t 
intuit ively obvious. The wage-differential between 
agriculture and manufacturing, referred to by Hagen, 
introduces two kinds of inef f ic iencies in the economy. 
! ' I 
F i r s t , it adversely affects production possibi l it ies 
in the econom/- i . e . , the domestic production-possibility 
curve gets "contracted" . Second, as pointed out above, it 
causes the social marginal rate of transforming agriculture 
into industry : to ; ,differ from the market price ratio . Now, - r " • ( ' 
29/ Johnson /~18_7\and Bhagwati and Krish.naswami /~5J/ 
arrive at thtvsam<i conclusion.-
r 
protection cannot remedy e i ther of these i n e f f e c i e n c y , 
' ' A subsidy on manufacturing w i l l rectify the second 
but w i l l f a i l to rect i fy the f i r s t i n e f f i c i e n c y 
i n e f f i c i e n c y / . On the other hand, a subsidy on factor-use 
w i l l rectif both t'-e ineff ic iencies " - that i c , w i l l 
'help t e economy to atta in the optimum optimorum and i s , 
• t h e r e f o r e , the optimal policy "hen distortion occurs in 
factor-use. 
The Growth lr,gument_ 
The previous discussion was conducted on " s t a t i c " 
assumptions. Th is , however, does not invalidate the 
. , ' j 2 0 / 
conclusions we reached there in the growth context. The 
upshot of the previous argument, to put it rather 
simply, i s that a " d i r e c t " remed should be preferred 
to an " i n d i r e c t " one, since the latter may ^lso have unde-
sirable " s i d e - e f f e c t s " . Subsidy (or tax) is to be preferred 
to protection i n cases where the problem is to remedy 
an i n e f f i c i e n t a l locat ion of domestic resources, that i s , 
when t ere is distortion 5n domestic production ,primarily 
because protection is not only an uncerta in remedy i n 
this case , but it also imposes addit ional "consumption cost" 
on the economy that can be avoided i.f a direct subsidy 
i s given on domestic" production. 
However,even a subsidy on domestic production may be t . — i n e f f i c i e n t if t'->e d istort ion occurs in factor-use. In this 
- .. r' I 
case the subsidy has '"to be confined to the factor in the 
use of which the " d i s t o r t i o n " occurs. It w i l l be shown i n 
this section that these conclusions are val id even when 
we are considering the "dynamic" 'arguments f o r protection . 
As appointed out in the introductory part of this 
paper , a genuine growth argument f o r p r o t e c t i o n should 
3QJ On-this point see, Fr i tz M c ' c h l u p / ^ / , nfyere he argues 
that the value of a theory depend*?" on I.vsw real ist ic are' 
the conclusions that i t po ints to , and not on the 
assumptions on which it is ba sed. ' Assumptions being 
simplifi cations cf reality are i n e v i t a b l y u n r e a l i s t i c . 
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case for the domestic production of imported goods. It may well 
be that the country may have a long-run comparative disadvantage 
i n producing that good domestically, 
Nurkse, Lewis, Fleming, have further elaborated on this 
theme. One of the important obstacles bedeviling the home-produc-
tion of import-substitutes is the limited size of the domestic 
'market. a s a spur for the expansion of the domestic market, 
these authors have suggested the simultaneous setting up of 
34 / 
related industries , which should provide effective demand for 
each other 's products,, It follows from this that protection must 
be given to a large number of related industries simulteneously* 
The hidden premise on which this argument is based should, 
however, be noted. It is that capital i s available in unlimited 
supply. This is elearly ahighly unrealistic premise, for the 
shortage of capital is clearly one of the central problems fac-
ing underdeveloped countries and the acceleration of the rate of 
capital, formation is the central objective of development 
policy i n these countries. • ' 
Two mere important variations cn this theme should be 
mentioned. It has been argued 'iiat heavier protection should be 
given to capital-goods industr .os to maximize saving and invest-
ment as v e i l as to reduce dependence on imports. In I n d a this 
view was put forward by Mahal'anot:: s / H 7 . The reason why the 
development of heavy capital-goods industries increases savings 
i s that, since these goods ca\ lot be directly consumed, the 
consumer is forced to save--:', variant of the "foreed-saving" 
argument. Furthermore, this argument postulates that the ratio 
of investment is an increasing function of the level of domestic 
production of capital goods, '."'huh, protection accorded capital-
goodg industries will promote saving and investment. 
3,4/yH'iile Nurkse and Lewis advocate the setting up of 
. b^rizontallj-related indnst ries ,Hirschman and Fleming 
emphasize v<jrticaJLly -related industries . Their respective _ 
approaches GO the'jorocess f-F economic growth are referred 
to as the ''Balanced G'rowtt and ''Unbalanced Growth" doctrin-
- e s , a pointless d ist inct ! ; n that, has led to much useless 
dsbate, reminiscent of the wasteful controvery on the 
e.jaality cf saving and inve stment in the late 3 0 r s , 
- 2 4 ~ 
Galenson and Lei bens t e i n / l l 7 have also advocated pro tec-' 
tion to increase savings. Assuming that the capitalist class does 
almost all the saving, a larger part of the national income should 
accrue to this class to maximize saving and investrnert(capitalists 
are also assumed to reinvest the major part of their income). 
Protection is recommended to achieve this objective. For,accord-
ing to a standard theorem i n international-trade theory,protec-
tion wi l l tend to increase the relati ve and absolute shares of 
the gains from trade accruing to capital i n a capital source 
country even i f protection lowers national income by making 
. 3 5 / • 
resource allocation less e f f ic ient . 
The f irst point to note about these argument's is that of 
"misplaced orientation" . The burden of these arguments is the 
augmentation of savings, but t \ey focus on production allocation 
instead. In other words, the error i s to try t© get growth by 
choice, of what to produce instead of operating on savings. This 
is the Mahalanobis error and springs from using a Marxian growth 
model. Secondly, this argument admits the possibility that tariffs 
may promote inefficiency i n resource allocation. It is obviously 
hardly worthwhile to try to increase savings at the expense cf 
efficiency i n resource-use. 
Further-more, tie whole approach that reliese on investment 
in heavy capital-goods industries to increase saving and invest-
ment is of doubtful validity because it is based on the un-
realistic assumption that f i scal policy is totally ineffective 
36 / 
in extracting savings or taxes from wages. Now, quite a few of 
the underdeveloped, countries, li e Pakistan and Ind ia , have a 
f a i r l y effective f i s c a l machineries. The problem of promoting saving 
and investment i s , therefore, best taken care of by means of 
subsidies on domestic income and output. It w i l l be a wasteful 
de force to achieve this result by setting up ineff icient 
industries through protection - like swinging a sledge-hammer in 
the hope that the nut wl 11 insert i tse l f under_J.tj 
,35/lt wil l be recognised that this i s a direct application of the-
Stolper-Sameulson T'b eorem: Tariffs tend, to increase both the 
relative and the ab_; jolute reward of the country's scarce factor,, 
See StoTper-Samuel son Z_ 3 7 -7* 
'36/Galenson and Lei ben; stein explicitly make thi'j assumption. 
• ISHAQ*/ 
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Infant - Industry Argument for Protection 
The infant-industry" case has generally been accepted as 
17/ 
providing a valid (growth) argument for protection. Essentially 
the argument is that these industries, because of i n i t ia l high 
costs of production, cannot withstand foreign competition. 
Protection is advocated because future benefits from the 
establishment of such industries are assumed to be substantial . 
There is a strong case for state intervention since the 
private investors tend to discount future benefits at a higher 
cost than the society. As a result present losses weigh more 
heavily in their investment decisions. The private and social 
M / 
rates of transformation w i l l then be di f ferent . The net effect 
of the d i f ferential in the private and social rates of transfor-
mation is that private investors may find these industries 
unprofitable. However, on the other hand, because of the 
external economies that these industries generate,the establish-
ment of such industries becomes socially desirable . 
The general principles regarding optimal government 
intervention when the distortion is domestic are applicable 
here also - that is , a subsidy on domestic production is the 
optimal policy in order to remove the distortion caused by a 
d i f ferent ia l in the private and social rates of transformation. 
3 7 / However,, Johnson / 16, 1 & _ J and. Bhagwati and Krishnaswami 
/ " 5 _ 7 have challenged this argument.. The discussion on this 
section is based on the writings of these authors. 
3 & / The private and social ratesof transformation may also 
d i f fer because the setting up of infant industries may 
generate external economies that cannot be appropriated 
by the private investors but are socially desirable . The 
supply of skilled labor, for instance, may eventually 
increase because of the .establishment of,. such infant 
, ; industries. The-• infant-industry ..argument has sometimes 
been confused with the external-economies argument. However, 
as Johnson ha.s pointed out & J the. two arguments are 
logically d ist inct . V/hereas the externals economies argument 
involves' a "p^'Mnerit' 1 distorti'oti' and~ hence permanent state 
intervention, the "distortion" in the infant-industry case 
is temporary and hence state intervention is also temporary, 
•ci Moreover, the infant-industry argument Is "dynamic" whereas 
the external-economies argument is static . 
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Let us consider the nature of this distortion in domestic 
L ... • . • 
production. The in it ial high domestic cost of production w i l l 
cause t d o m e s t i c marginal rate of transformation to differ 
marginal 
from the foreign/rate of transformation. However, the domestic 
rate of substitution in consumption, unequal to domestic rate 
of transformation, w i l l be equal to the foreign rate of 
transformation in production. 
• Mow a t a r i f f on imports may eoualize the domestic and 
foreign rates of transformations but w i l l disrupt the pre-
existing equality between the domestic marginal rate of 
substitution and the foreign marginal rate of transformation. 
Hence protection is a sub-optimal policy. On the other hand, 
subsidy on domestic production, set at the right rate, w i l l 
and 
remove the inequality between the domestic/foreign social 
marginal rates of transformation, without disturbing the 
substitution and the foreign marginal rate of transformation 
pre-existing equality between the domestic marginal rate of / 
Thus subsidy and not protection is the optimal policy 
to help set up the socially desirable infant industries. 
However, th is subsidy may not be given on domestic production. 
I f the private rate of transformation di f fers from the social 
rate of transformation because these industries require heavy 
of 3 9 / 
investment in on-the-job training / labor , the subsidy should 
take the form of setting up of labor-training.centers. 
There is an important case for protection which should 
it0/ 
be now noted. It is that protection may lead the foreign 
supplier of the imported goods? who has been denieckaccess to 
the domestic market, to set up manufacturing units within the 
country, in collaboration with doriiestic investors. This may also 
provided that this inflow of foreign capital 
lead to additional inflow of foreign capital /brings net gains to 
the country, protection may serve a useful purpose. 
1 2 / Sinee the setting up of in i t ia l ly high-cost industries in the. 
hops of future benefits is essentially a kind of investment, 
resource allocation w i l l be socially suboptiraal - i . e . , a 
-"distortion" w i l l occur in domestic investment i f these 
industries are not set up. See Johnson j|7* 
4 0 / See Bhagwati Z~7_7. 
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Summary, Qualifications and Conclusion 
The preceding discussion shows that arguments for using 
protection as a primary instrument to remove domestic distortion, 
arising either from external economies, monopoly elements in 
production or a rural-urban wage d i f ferent ia l , or from a 
d i f ferential in the social and private rates of discount, are 
in effect arguments for providing subsidies (or taxes) on 
domestic production. Ve have also seen that protection is a 
wasteful policy in order to promote saving and investment. It 
is pure commonsense that , instead of promoting savin;? by setting 
up possibly inefficient industries , it is far better to achieve 
this objective more directly by using appropriate f i scal 
pol icies . Furthermore, in developing countries, which operate 
large investment programs, protection is not required to exert 
"pressures" on private investors to invest. Also, foreign 
competition is , a fter a l l , only one factor influencing investment 
decisions; avai labi l ity of investible funds, s k i l l and entre-
preneurial talents are perhaps more important. Moreover, when 
domestic production cannot expand readily in response to price 
incentives, protection may become a bottleneck both on the demand 
side as well as on the supply side. On the one hand, by raising 
the domestic prices of inputs used in domestic industries , 
protection w i l l raise domestic cost of production. Ho -ever 
under certain conditions protection, by attracting foreign 
investors to set up joint projects in the country, may prove 
benef ic ia l . 
This is not to condemn protection per se . For this 
is not a case for free trade either. It has been, shown that, 
when domestic "d istort ion " exists, free trade is not the 
optimal policy. I/hat in effect has been argued is that , 
- although the " f a i l u r e " of the free-trade solution because of 
constitute a case for state intervention, it does 
domestic distortion does/not follow that this should necessarily 
take the form of protection. The form that this intervention 
takes should rather be decided by a comparison of a l l the 
alternative policy instruments available to the government. 
It Is..;j.ust a question of the re lat iv i ty of the various availabl 
policy instruments with respect to the social policy goals . 
The reason why protection turned out to be an infer ior 
policy instrument in our discussion is that it was considered 
in relat ion to problems that could be best taken care of by 
other policy instruments, Of course, our conclusions would 
have been of a completely "academic" Interest i f a country 
were so underdeveloped that It had no other policy instrument, 
except protection, " strong" enough to do the job . Moreover, 
in such a case protection as a policy instrument may not have 
so many defects - that i s , ' it may be equal to a "general ' ' tax , 
It appears that it is some such economy (most African countries 
w i l l f a l l in this group) that economists, who advocate 
protection , may have conjured up when wr i t ing about these 
problems. Our discussion is not a cr it ic ism of their judgement 
but it only warns the reader that these arguments should not be 
accepted uncr it ical ly in the context of countries l ike Pakistan 
and I n d i a , where other equally strong policy instruments are 
also ava i lable to the government. In these countries suitable 
tax-cum-subsidy pol ic ies (or investment p o l i c i e s ) influence 
domestic production more d i r e c t l y . Th is , however, does not 
preclude the imposition of import taxes as a part of the tax 
program instituted to finance subsid ies . 
There are two very important issues that we have not 
discussed so far . 
The f i r s t question relates to the cost of f inancing the 
subsidy . In arguing that optimal government intervention to 
rjnove domestic d istort ion should take the fcrm of subsidies 
(or taxes) on production or on factrr-use, we made the implicit 
assumption that subsidies do not impose a cost on the economy. 
S u b s i d i e s may have to be financed through a d d i t i o n a l taxation , 
IJo doubt protection also involves £ cost , but l:h3se costs are 
not v i s i b l e . Thus, i f only for p o l i t i c a l reasons , governments 
jaay use protection instead of g iving subsidies,, However, this 
argument is fa l lacious because th-j effect of a subsidy to a 
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particular industry can also be secured by taxing other 
industries more heavily; or alternatively by exempting from 
tax the industry in question, while retaining taxes on other 
industries. 
The cost of financing the subsidy, however, raises 
deeper issues regarding the validity of our argument. This is 
the question of the "neutrality" of taxes and subsidies with 
respect to its effects on the allocation of domestic resources. 
Suppose a "partial"' excise tax is levied. It is well known that 
4 1 / 
such a tax imposes an "excess burden"" on the economy because it 
enters as a wedge between the price paid and the price received, 
thereby destroying the equality either-.between cost of pro-
duction and the gross price paid by the consumer in the product 
market, or the equality between cost of factor purchase and the 
proceeds from factor sales in the factor market, The resulting 
changes in prices may lead to substitutions in the purchase 
(or sale) of products and factors. As a result , the cost of 
public services to the public may be greater than it would have 
been if taxes .were raise;! ...in a manner net causing the two sorts 
of interferences -in - the allocation,.xie_chsx ism referred to above. 
Thus partial excise taxes, imposed to finance the subsidy, 
may themselves introduce distortions in the form Of an "excess 
burden" (defined in the previous sentence). If it were not 
possible to .levy taxes to fi-i.ance product:.on subsidies without 
imposing an "excess burden" cn the economy then5according to 
the General Theorem of the Second Best, there would have been 
no a priori reason to prefer a subsidy over protection, for 
both remove-a set of "distortions" at the t;:pense of introducing 
another. 
However, this objection applies only ro a "partial " 42/ 
excise tax. A truly "general" tax is free frcn this objection. 
jr./. For a discussion of the 'excess burden" imposed by excise 
taxes see Musgrave / 29 J < 
LP./ The "generality'1' of a t r x has been defined n follows: 
"A tax i s made more gereral i f its coverage is extended over 
a wide range of economic choices of the same- type? of choices 
that may be substitut ad more or less readir* • such as alter-
native opportunities or alternative invest) .ent outlets, " 
Musgrave and Paggy P ..chman /~30_J7-
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Such a tax w i l l cover all commodities that can be readily-
substituted for one another. Nov;, since imports are the most 
direct substitutes for domestically-produced goods, a tax on 
imports may be a part of the taxes imposed to finance a subsidy. 
In this way taxes on imports, having incidental protection 
effects, may form an integral part of the policy of tax-cum-
subsidy on production. 
It i s , however, important to differentiate the present 
case where a tax on imports is a part of the tax policy to 
finance a subsidy to domestic production from the case (envisaged 
by protectionists) when import taxes ( tar i f fs ) are considered 
to be a primary instrument for encouraging the home production 
of import substitutes. 
There is yet another related issue that we have not 
touched upon so far . He have advocated using several policy 
instruments to achieve various policy targets . This raises the 
question of the possibility of some conflict in the use of 
various policy instruments. For instance, import restrictions 
f a l l most heavily on "non-essential" consumer goods. This 
happens primarily because, faced with the problem of allocating 
limited foreign exchange among various uses, "non-essential" 
imports are the obvious victims. However this policy, by raising 
the domestic prices of these goods (assuming that the elasticity 
of supply of domestic import-substitutes is greater than unity ) , 
may- induce greater private investment in the home-product ion of 
these goods. Yet an increased production and consumption of 
these goods may conflict with the plan objective of discouraging 
the consumption of such goods. On the other hand, l iberal 
imports of capital *oods may repel domestic Investment from these 
areas (again assuming that home production of these >*oods is 
p o s s i b l e ) . This may conflict with the Government's policy of 
encouraging investment in such l ines . hat, then ,can be done 
i 
to remove this " inconsistency" in the use of policy instruments? 
The usual answer has been that heavier protection should 
be accorded the. home production of capital goods. But such a 
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policy can be very harmful, if the domestic production of such 
goods cannot be readily expanded. 'What should, then, be done? 
. My—view- is--that in--such-a'"situation various policy 
instruments have to be used in an offsetting fashion, to some 
I 
extent. For instance, the incentive .'to invest in the production 
'.'non-essential" -goods,--caused by the restriction of their 
domestic production should be offset by increased taxes on their 
domestic production. And, if the government fails to do this , 
then "fault"-is that--of f iscal policy. 
It follows that a consistent use of the various policy 
instruments does not mean that a l l policy instruments point In 
the same direction; What it should mean is that, on balance, the 
policy instruments should be used in such a fashion as to promote 
the socially optimal pattern of investment. 
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